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Introduction
Transaction cost economics (TCE) explains firm boundaries and the governance and control structures that sustain risky transactions between firms (Williamson 1985) . TCE predicts that if transaction risks are great but not great enough to deter the transaction or to prompt vertical integration, then firms will trade off the costs of management control investments and the expected costs of control loss (collectively termed the "cost of control"). Empirical studies affirm this tradeoff indirectly. They find that "misalignment" of transaction risks and interfirm controls is positively associated with ex post transaction problems and diminished partnership performance (e.g., Anderson and Dekker 2005; Sampson 2004 ), renegotiation (Reuer and Ariño 2002) , and opportunistic behavior (Anderson et al. 2000) . The control-residual risk tradeoff rarely eliminates transaction risk. Indeed, the residual risk after deploying interfirm controls typically includes both performance risks that accompany complex, interdependent tasks and relational risks that arise when firms' self-interest is misaligned (Das and Teng 1996) . The empirical literature documents a positive association between transaction risk and the use of interfirm controls (e.g., Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006) . However, the literature neglects the influence of the cost of control on this association and does not study directly the theorized negative association between interfirm control investments and residual risk.
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Prior studies have questioned why firms facing common transaction risks use interfirm controls with differing intensity (Fabrizio 2012; Madhok 2002) . We posit that variation in the cost function that moderates the association between transaction risks and control investments provides an important overlooked explanation. Specifically, variation in the cost of control influences the control-residual risk tradeoff. We focus on two partnership-specific factors that proxy for this variation: prior ties between exchange partners and the criticality of strategic resources to the transaction. Theory from TCE and a complementary literature, the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, suggests mechanisms by which these factors influence the cost of control and the selected mix of controls and residual risk. Das and Teng's (1996) two-part classification of risk is the basis for the hypotheses of the effects of prior ties and strategic resources on the acceptance of residual performance risk and residual relational risk.
Theoretically, prior ties lower the cost of controlling a given transaction risk because partners learn to coordinate effectively, which reduces performance risk, and develop greater trust in each other, which reduces relational risk (Gulati, Lavie and Singh 2009) . For a given level of ex ante transaction risk, prior ties indicate a downward shift of the cost of control function that lowers costs without "penalty" of either increased residual performance or relational risks. We test the hypotheses that prior ties attenuate the relation between transaction risk and control investments without inducing a proportional increase in either residual performance risk or residual relational risk.
The RBV extends TCE theory to the special circumstance of transactions that combine partners' scarce and inimitable resources for value-creation. For partnerships requiring strategic resources, the cost of control is altered by firms' increased tolerance for performance risk in activities with high expected returns (Combs and Ketchen 1999) . Thus, strategic resources are hypothesized to strengthen the relation between transaction risk and control investments without a proportional decrease in residual performance risk. Transactions with strategic resources typically involve suppliers with favorable reputations, which reduce the cost of control by enhancing partner trust before making control-residual risk tradeoffs (Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath 2002) . Thus, strategic resources are hypothesized to attenuate the relation between transaction risk and control investments without a proportional increase in residual relational risk.
To test these hypotheses, we use survey data collected from 287 medium-sized Belgian firms that recently engaged in a significant, risky procurement transaction for information technology (IT) products and services. The transactions vary in control investments and residual risks, suggesting that meaningful tradeoffs have occurred. Control costs are not readily measured (Dye 1985; Tirole 1999 ) and the cost function relating risk to control investment and control loss is unknown. Nonetheless, the common regression model specification for testing TCE that relates transaction risk to the use of management controls suggests an approach for testing the hypotheses. Specifically, the residual of the TCE regression is often interpreted as control misalignment; however, this interpretation is valid only if all firms face the same costs of control (i.e., if all firms respond identically to risk). With varying costs of control, TCE predicts different tradeoffs. The hypotheses of this paper are theorized based on the expected effects of prior ties and strategic resources on the cost of control and the resultant tradeoffs. In particular, we examine whether the firm invests more or less in control than the TCE regression predicts and whether this difference is associated with residual risk. The tests for whether prior ties and strategic resources alter the cost of control as predicted are operationalized by comparing the regression residual of the TCE regression (i.e., control misalignment) to direct measures of residual performance risk and residual relational risk for transactions with and without these characteristics. The hypotheses that prior ties reduce the cost of control and attenuate the associations of the TCE regression are tested by examining whether control misalignment correlates less strongly with residual performance and relational risk for partners with prior ties. Similar tests are conducted for transactions with low and high levels of strategic resources to test the hypotheses that suppliers with strategic resources reduce the cost of control for relational risk but increase the cost of control for performance risk. The results support the four hypothesized effects.
This study contributes to the extensive TCE literature and to the literature on management controls for interfirm transactions. We test a more complete specification of TCE that includes transaction risks, costs of control, and the tradeoffs that firms make between control investments and residual risk.
Although the cost of control is not readily measured, TCE and RBV provide a strong basis for theorizing about how prior ties and strategic resources influence the cost of control and the resultant control-residual risk tradeoff. Measurement innovations, specifically using survey data to measure residual risk directly to disentangle performance and relational risk, facilitate a new approach to examining how cost of control moderates the firm's response to transaction risk. The paper's focus on the cost function that relates ex ante risk to the control-residual risk tradeoff is novel and highlights opportunities for scholars to understand the costs of control investments and control loss.
The paper also contributes evidence that interfirm controls are best explained by treating the RBV motivation for interfirm exchange as a complement rather than alternative to TCE (Argyres and Zenger 2012; Combs and Ketchen 1999; Zajac and Olsen 1993) . By using separate measures of residual performance and relational risk, we disentangle two theoretically distinct effects of partnership characteristics on the control-residual risk tradeoff. In the case of prior ties, efficient coordination and competence trust that arise with partner-specific learning mitigate performance risk, and goodwill trust mitigates relational risk. In the case of strategic resources, firms' tolerance for performance risk increases because they anticipate higher returns. These resources also typically involve reputable suppliers, which increases goodwill trust and mitigates relational risk. Gulati et al. (2009 Gulati et al. ( , p. 1218 argue that prior ties and "partner distinctiveness" (similar to the provision of strategic resources) work in tandem to facilitate value creation. We find joint effects of prior ties and strategic resources on the control-residual risk tradeoff, which supports this proposition and highlights how controls support value creation.
Literature review and hypothesis development

Risk and control of interfirm transactions
Transaction cost economics explains firm boundaries and the governance and control structures that accompany risky interfirm transactions as the result of minimizing the sum of production and transaction costs (Williamson 1985) . Das and Teng (1996) discriminate between two types of risks for interfirm transactions characterized by uncertainty and information asymmetry: performance risks associated with inherently complex tasks that demand a coordinated response and relational risks that arise when firms' interests are not aligned. If these risks are neither trivial nor extreme (e.g., which would predict arms-length market transactions and vertical integration, respectively), then TCE predicts that firms will use management controls to mitigate risk and sustain mutually beneficial trade. TCE also predicts that firms will trade off the cost of control to obtain a configuration of controls and residual risk that enables transacting and minimizes the total cost of control (for an illustration of this tradeoff, see online Appendix A1). This tradeoff typically results in intentionally incomplete (in the classical sense of complete contracts anticipating all contingencies) controls and some residual risk, because the investment cost of controlling all contingencies is too great, compared with the cost of control loss. This implies that, for a given transaction, control investment is correlated negatively with residual risk.
Although the influence of control costs is often acknowledged in empirical tests of TCE (e.g., Crocker and Masten 1988; Anderson and Dekker 2005) , prior studies typically test a simplified model of the association between transaction characteristics that proxy for risk and the use of management controls, with the assumption that the cost of control is invariant across observations. With greater risk, firms invest more in contracting and use controls more extensively to manage the transaction (e.g., Anderson and Dekker 2005; Arnold et al. 2012; Crocker and Masten 1988; Ryall and Sampson 2009) . If the cost function relating a particular risk to the cost of control is invariant across transactions, then one can estimate the relation between risk and control investments without considering residual risk, because the theory predicts a common control-residual risk response for all observations. However, if this assumption is too strong and firms face different costs of control for a given transaction risk, then TCE predicts that firms will make different control-residual risk tradeoffs. Imprecision in estimating a common coefficient relating transaction risk to controls confounds observation-specific differences in the coefficient (i.e., model misspecification) with measurement error.
It is difficult to ascertain the vulnerability of prior results to the assumption of invariant cost of control. Prior research indicates that firms vary considerably in the effectiveness with which they design 6 interfirm controls (Kale, Dyer and Singh 2002) . Tirole (1999 pp. 772-3) notes that direct measures of contracting costs are illusive: "While there is no arguing that writing down detailed contracts is very costly, we have no good paradigm in which to apprehend such costs." A common (and often criticized) theoretical approach is to model control costs as a fixed cost per contract contingency (Dye 1985) .
Consequently, studies that document a positive association between transaction risk and controls (e.g., Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar 2006) have neglected the possibility of varying cost of control and of risk-bearing as an alternative to or complement of control investments. We have little understanding of why firms facing common transaction risks use interfirm controls with differing intensity (Fabrizio 2012) .
In this paper, we posit that differing costs of control offer a powerful explanation. Specifically, we hypothesize that the control-residual risk tradeoff is influenced by variation in the cost of control that accompanies two partnership-specific factors: prior ties between exchange partners and the criticality of strategic resources to the transaction (for an illustration of the conceptual model, see online Appendix A2). We review theory and evidence for using these factors to proxy for varying costs of control in tests of whether observed control-residual risk tradeoffs correspond with TCE and RBV theory.
Prior ties between exchange partners
Repeated transactions between exchange partners confer operational efficiencies in contracting and transacting that accrue from learning and trust (Gulati et al. 2009 ). Prior studies of interfirm control identify the mechanisms by which prior ties between partners reduce the cost of control. Specifically, efficiency in the development of management controls lowers the cost of control investments, and experience-based trust reduces the need for control investments and lowers the cost of control loss (e.g., Dekker 2008 , Gulati 1995 Ryall and Sampson 2009 ). Thus, experienced exchange partners face lower costs of coordination and reduced monitoring requirements for new transactions with one another (Gulati et al. 2009 ). Gulati (1995) emphasizes the importance of prior ties in aligning partner interests. Even different transactions that are embedded in a longstanding relationship create a bond between partners that mitigates risk. Studies of whether prior ties affect interfirm controls hypothesize that transactions are nested in a broader economic and social relationship that exerts influence on all transactions between the partners. Studies consider this influence as dynamic, characterized by learning by doing (Gulati et al. 2009 ) and as a socially constructed trust between partners with repeated transactions (Gulati 1995; Gulati et al. 2009; Ryall and Sampson 2009 ).
The moderating effects of prior ties on the relation between transaction characteristics and interfirm controls are distinct for performance risk and relational risk. Performance risk is inherent to any complex task. It is exacerbated in interfirm transactions by the challenge of coordinating actions across firm boundaries (Das and Teng 1996) . For given transaction characteristics, transactions between partners with prior ties enjoy reduced performance risk as compared to those between new exchange partners.
Familiar partners understand each other's capabilities, have learned to adapt and coordinate their actions, and have developed "competence trust" (Gulati et al. 2009; Kale et al. 2002; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Ryall and Sampson 2009 ). Through interaction, firms learn about each other's business practices, routines, capabilities, and interdependencies between their activities. The effect of transaction uncertainties that TCE predicts to be associated with interfirm controls are attenuated between familiar exchange partners (Gulati 1995) . Thus, familiar partners are more selective in using controls that fit the needs of the exchange relation, and they are more cost-effective in implementing controls (Gulati et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Ryall and Sampson 2009; Vanneste and Puranam 2010) . Gulati et al. (2009) find that learning is a partner-specific experience rather than a general experience of partnering.
The benefits of learning within relationships are evident in interfirm control structures (e.g., Vanneste and Puranam 2010) and in improved subsequent transaction performance (e.g., Kale et al. 2002) .
Prior ties between exchange partners are also hypothesized to influence relational risk, but for different reasons. Specifically, prior ties is a proxy for "goodwill trust", in which transaction partners set aside narrowly self-interested behavior in the interest of the partnership's continuation (Gulati 1995) .
Goodwill trust creates an expectation that a partner will act in the long run interests of the relationship, even when doing so does not maximize the partner's profit. Goodwill trust has been described as an alternative to management controls (Gulati 1995) . We describe the mechanisms of substitution, positing that prior ties and associated goodwill trust reduce the investment in control for a given transaction risk without a concomitant increase in the expected cost of control loss (i.e., residual relational risk). The interfirm literature provides theoretical and empirical support for the influence of prior ties on reduced control investments that emanate from relationship-specific learning and goodwill trust. It also supports a model in which prior ties attenuate the association between transaction risks and the use of controls (Dekker 2008; Gulati et al. 2009 ).
1 Consequently, we predict that prior ties lower the cost of control for a given set of transaction risks and manifest in the control-residual risk tradeoff as follows:
H1a:
The presence of prior ties between exchange partners attenuates the relation between transaction risk and control investments without inducing a proportional increase in residual performance risk.
H1b:
The presence of prior ties between exchange partners attenuates the relation between transaction risk and control investments without inducing a proportional increase in residual relational risk.
Resource-based motivations for exchange
1 While prior studies have typically examined direct effects of prior ties on governance and control choices (e.g., Gulati 1995) , more recent studies have considered moderating effects, with prior ties affecting the relation between transaction characteristics and these choices (e.g., Dekker 2008) . In sensitivity tests of our results, we add direct effects of prior ties and reach similar conclusions.
8
In contrast to the cost-minimizing logic of TCE, RBV posits that interfirm collaboration is motivated by the pursuit of growth and value creation, which are achieved by combining the unique strategic resources of exchange partners (Argyres and Zenger 2012; Combs and Ketchen 1999) . The motivation for value creation through collaboration may be unilateral, where one firm seeks access to partner technology or knowledge, or joint, where firms form strategic alliances (Hitt et al. 2000) .
Combining arguments from TCE and RBV provides insight into how firms organize transactions with different resource profiles in distinct ways (Combs and Ketchen 1999; Argyres and Zenger 2012) .
Prior studies argue that the pursuit of value creation moderates firms' responses to transaction conditions (Combs and Ketchen 1999; Madhok 2002 ) and alters firms' exposure to performance risk (Das and Teng 1996) . Zajac and Olsen (1993) theorize that when interfirm transactions hinge on gaining access to unique resources, the emphasis of control shifts from preventing value appropriation to promoting value creation. Combs and Ketchen (1999) theorize that a firm's need for strategic resources moderates the firm's control response to transaction conditions. With the same conditions, a firm with greater resource needs is willing to bear greater control costs. Madhok (2002) similarly stresses that understanding resource considerations can be imperative for understanding why "there are variations in organizational form under similar transaction characteristics or, alternatively, why different firms organize similar transactions in different ways" (p. 51).
We posit that the heightened performance risk that accompanies a firm's pursuit of value creation shifts the cost function that relates transaction risk to the cost of control upward. That is, a given transaction is associated with greater control investment and greater expected costs of control loss when firms want access to another's strategic resources than otherwise (Combs and Ketchen 1999) .
Accordingly, greater importance of a supplier's strategic resources to a buyer requires greater control investment than indicated by transaction characteristics alone. For instance, when a buyer contracts with a supplier to develop tailored software with high asset specificity, task interdependence, and uncertainty, the impact of these characteristics on performance risk differs depending on the strategic importance to the buyer. This is because strategic resources alter the transaction's value-creating potential and the buyer's cost of failure. Strategic resources cause buyers to invest more in controls to mitigate risk, but they may also cause them to accept greater residual performance risk (cf. Combs and Ketchen 1999).
The arguments for how strategic resources affect firms' exposure to relational risk are different.
Strategic transactions that expose firms to greater performance risk are associated with careful selection of reputable exchange partners who possess critical strategic resources (Hitt et al. 2000; Ireland et al. 2002; Dekker 2008) . Supplier reputation provides a signal to buyers about a supplier's resource base and past behavior. This knowledge increases the buyer's goodwill trust and can reduce relational risk (Gulati 9 1995) , effectively shifting the cost of control function downward. 2 In addition to inferences about supplier intentions that are extrapolated from reputation, a buyer's goodwill trust in the supplier relies on "calculative trust" that a supplier will not risk reputational damage with misconduct (e.g., Gulati 1995) .
Together, these mechanisms support the prediction that strategic resources attenuate the association between transaction risks and control investments without a proportional increase in residual relational risk.
3 Thus, we predict that strategic resources will moderate the control-residual risk tradeoff:
H2a: Importance of the supplier's strategic resources strengthens the relation between transaction risk and control investments without a proportional decrease in residual performance risk.
H2b: Importance of the supplier's strategic resources attenuates the relation between transaction risk and control investments without a proportional increase in residual relational risk.
Empirical tests and research setting
Method of testing
Empirical tests of TCE examine the association between transaction risks and control investments. Hypotheses H1 and H2 predict that partnership characteristics that alter the cost of control will moderate this association. Typically, tests for moderating effects compare nested regression models to determine whether inclusion of a moderator variable improves model fit. However, this approach becomes unwieldy if the regression includes many independent variables (i.e., transaction characteristics that proxy for risk) and moderators (i.e., prior ties and strategic resources) that together yield a multiplicatively expanding set of interaction terms. Even if multicollinearity does not jeopardize interpretation of the estimated coefficients, TCE theory is not developed sufficiently to support distinct hypotheses about the moderators' separate effects on the transaction characteristics that jointly describe transaction risk. To address these concerns, we test for moderating effects using a series of contrasts between the basic TCE regression model that presumes cost invariance and the control-residual risk tradeoffs that are observed for transactions with and without the moderating conditions. and without prior ties and with high and low strategic resources. We test for significance of correlational differences using the r-statistic (Silver et al. 2008) . If cost of control varies as predicted with the two moderators, then misalignment will be significantly correlated with residual risk as predicted by the hypotheses. If it does not, then misalignment will be interpreted as managers' errors in control investment, and no difference between the tested subgroups in the correlation with residual risk is expected. Indeed, if errors occur randomly and are unknown to the managers, then the correlation with residual risk should be insignificantly different from zero for all subgroups.
Research setting
We use survey data collected from medium-sized Belgium firms that recently completed a major IT transaction with an external supplier (Dekker and Van den Abbeele 2010). These IT procurement transactions range from relatively low complexity (e.g., standard software, hardware, equipment, and associated services) with moderate control problems to high complexity (e.g., tailor-made software and In sampling appropriate IT transactions, we closely follow Anderson and Dekker (2005) and Batenburg et al. (2003) . We collect information about a range of IT products and services that mediumsized firms buy from IT vendors. Respondents provided information on the firm's most important IT 11 investment in the past five years. These investments reflect independent transactions to avoid any interdependencies that may affect risk and control choices (e.g., Anderson et al. 2000) . The lowest risks are predicted to occur in transactions with combinations of standard hardware, software, and associated equipment in which the buyer relies upon the supplier's knowledge to evaluate needs and configure components. The highest risks are predicted for transactions with highly customized development projects that include relationship-specific investments, high levels of integration, and mutual coordination between the buyer and supplier. Thus, the sampled transactions exclude simple arm's length transactions in which the buyer purchases off-the-shelf components, but include collaborative transactions that vary significantly in relational and performance risks. The presence of strategic resources also varies among the transactions. Tailor-made software, design, and consulting services are necessary investments that have limited impact on value creation for some buyers and critical impact for others. This provides requisite variation to test the hypotheses.
Major IT transactions can be particularly risky for medium-sized firms, which typically lack inhouse IT development skills and knowledge. These firms outsource IT selection, system design, and installation. 4 In 242 cases, information was provided about supplier identity. Approximately 79% of the suppliers are local Belgian firms and 21% are international IT firms. 5 Many suppliers provide industryspecific solutions or solutions to support specific business activities (e.g., production scheduling, quality management, inventory and logistics support). For the buyers, IT transactions are characterized by significant information asymmetry with the supplier, because buyers have limited IT resources, knowledge, and capacity for in-house development. A timely response demands collaboration with suppliers to obtain IT services. The challenge lies in balancing interfirm control and residual risk.
Survey design and administration
The research sample of firms surveyed is drawn from the Amadeus database. Sample firms had to be located in Flanders, with 50 to 250 employees, and with turnover between EUR 10 and EUR 50 million and/or total assets between EUR 10 and EUR 43 million. 6 These criteria resulted in 1,538 medium-sized firms (see online Appendix A3 Panel A for population characteristics). Pre-notification has been shown to yield greater respondent involvement and commitment. Thus, one author and another 4 Telephone interviews indicated that less than 1% of sampled firms were excluded because they developed IT internally. Although these firms' inability to develop IT in-house may lead to an underrepresentation of risky and complex transactions in the sample, the data show no restricted range on the explanatory variables.
senior researcher trained and closely supervised a team of six research assistants who contacted all sample firms by telephone over a 10-week period to solicit participation in the study. The assistants followed a structured interview protocol to screen firms for suitability (i.e., having a recent major IT transaction) and to encourage participation. During this process, 275 firms were excluded as unsuitable, and 668 declined to participate. 7 For the 595 firms that agreed to participate, we identified an informant (typically an IT manager responsible for the transaction sampled). This person identified the most important IT investment of the last five years and completed the on-line survey about the focal transaction. To increase the response rate, non-respondents were sent a reminder and received two additional telephone calls. In total, 310 responses were obtained, representing a field response rate of 52% and an overall effective response rate of 25%. The average employment of respondents was 11 years, indicating that they were experienced and knowledgeable. After excluding observations with missing data, the sample contained 287 transactions. To detect and prevent analysis errors, two of the three authors started from the raw data exported directly from the online survey tool and conducted the analyses independently.
The average buyer in the sample has 114 employees and operating revenues of EUR 27.88 million (see online Appendix A3 Panel A). External validity is enhanced by sampling across different industries; the final sample includes utility, manufacturing, construction, and service firms. The differences between the population and sample means on firm size and industry classification are insignificant. Early and late respondents do not differ significantly in firm size, industry participation, transaction attributes, control mechanisms, or respondent age and tenure; thus, there is no indication of response bias.
Variable measures
The focal transaction that the respondent selected is the unit of analysis of the survey questions.
The survey distinguishes between time periods (i.e., before agreeing on the contract, around the contract, and after the contract). Questions are anchored to a specific time period. In the following sections, we describe how variables are measured using existing scales when available (see also Table 1 ). Unless stated otherwise, items are measured using a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 representing a low degree and 5 a high degree. For all items, all response categories were used, and the distributions show no important deviations from normality.
Interfirm control use
7 Reasons for exclusion included firms that could not be reached (137; e.g., out of business, location change), subsidiaries with no IT investment decisions (98), or firms in the same group as others in the sample with the same respondent (41). In the telephone interview the main reasons cited for not participating were no time (45%), no involvement in IT decisions because of outsourcing (10%), no interest (7%), company policy regarding survey participation (7%), not present (5%), and other reasons, such as firm size or lack of IT investment (27%). and on the number of clauses included in the contract (16 clauses) indicate that the sample of transactions cannot be managed easily by complete, standard contracts, supporting the need for careful control design.
Transaction characteristics that proxy for ex ante risk
We measure four transaction characteristics that proxy for ex ante risks: transaction value, asset specificity, uncertainty, and task interdependence. We also measure supplier competition to capture supplier power and influence in relation to the specific transaction (Anderson and Dekker 2005) . 
Residual risk
Residual risk is the risk that remains after implementing interfirm controls, or risk that has not been mitigated by controls. We take a novel approach by measuring residual risk directly. Following Das and Teng (2001), we measure residual relational risk as the buyers' assessments of the following four risks at the moment of agreeing on the transaction contract: the supplier may not carry out duties when not monitored, the supplier may not deliver on promises, the supplier may not be fair during the transaction, and the interests of the firm and those of the supplier may conflict. Following Agarwal and
Teas (2001), we measure residual performance risk as buyers' assessments of the following two risks at the moment of agreeing on the contract: the product or service may not perform as described and the product or service may not work satisfactorily. For all residual risk items, respondents were requested to consider "the information and control mechanisms that were available" and to focus on residual risk, given the firm's investment in interfirm controls.
We test criterion-related validity of the residual risk measures with two outcome measures. First, respondents reported the extent to which 12 common transaction problems emerged during or after the transaction (cf. Anderson and Dekker 2005) . As expected, the correlations of ex post problems with residual relational and performance risk are positive and significant (r=0.16 and r=0.20, both p < 0.01).
Second, respondents rated supplier performance (price, quality, and on-time delivery; composite reliability=0.80) which should be associated with lower residual risk. The correlations with residual relational risk and residual performance risk are indeed negative and significant (r=-0.21 and r=-0.23, both p < 0.01). Additional evidence that the measures reflect residual (instead of ex ante) risk is found in correlations with the transaction characteristics that proxy for ex ante risk that are generally small and in most cases insignificant (see Table 2 ). This evidence is consistent with firms mitigating risk through control investments.
Prior ties
Prior ties between partners are measured with an indicator (1=prior ties) of previous exchange before the focal transaction (Dekker 2008; Gulati 1995) . Although studies discriminate between learning and trust-building effects of prior ties, the effects are difficult to isolate because most studies use a single measure for the existence and duration of a prior relationship. Vanneste and Puranam (2010) isolate learning effects from trust-building effects by focusing on cross-sectional differences in the potential for learning associated with different contract terms. Directly measuring both residual performance risk and residual relational risk provides an alternative for distinguishing the effects. Specifically, learning and the development of competence trust are predicted to mitigate performance risk and building goodwill trust is predicted to mitigate relational risk. Thus, support for H1a is evidence of learning and competence trust, and support for H1b is evidence of the role of goodwill trust.
The potential for prior ties to build goodwill trust is significant in the research setting, where (by design) IT investments are independent of prior investments and buyers can choose among alternative suppliers. 9 We validate the association between prior ties and goodwill trust using a survey item that asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement: "My firm could trust the supplier to keep its promises." The mean score on this item is significantly higher (p< 0.01) for firms with prior ties, indicating criterion-related validity. For the subsample with prior ties, the average relationship duration is 6.8 years (median 5 years), indicating that buyers are on average satisfied with prior transactions and that they considered the supplier trustworthy before engaging in this transaction.
10 9 Answers to items about the buyer's effort towards comparing suppliers on price, reliability, service, and technological capabilities also support that they generally had choice among multiple suppliers for the transaction.
10 Satisfaction with the prior relation for firms with prior ties had a mean score of 4.06 on a 5-point Likert scale, with only two buyers reporting negative experiences. This fits the idea that firms prefer partners with whom they 16
Strategic resource importance
Measurement of the strategic importance of supplier resources, strategic resources, is based on Lui and Ngo (2004) . Three items reflect the importance to the buyer of the following supplier resources: the supplier's good reputation, the supplier's rich resources of capital and labor, and the supplier's technical capabilities. These items do not relate to specific transaction characteristics and instead capture more broadly the strategic importance of supplier resources to the buyer.
To test for validity, we first correlate the construct with a survey question about the extent to which the buyer possessed information at the time of contracting about the supplier's reputation for quality, 
Preliminary Analysis
Measurement model results
To assess the validity of construct measurement, we use maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis in LISREL 8.80. 11 Like prior studies (e.g., Anderson and Dekker 2005) , the measurement model treats all constructs as latent variables that are reflected by the measured survey items. significant and the standardized loadings are satisfactory. We compare the measurement model to alternatives that (1) specify all risk items as one factor, (2) specify all controls as one factor, (3) specify mixes of independent variables as single factors (e.g., size and asset specificity; complexity and uncertainty), and (4) specify one common factor for all items (i.e., common method bias). Chi-square difference tests and changes in fit statistics indicate that the fit of all alternative models is significantly worse, supporting the reported measurement model and limiting concerns about method bias.
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For each multi-item construct, Table 1 reports the composite reliability (CR) and the average variance (AVE) as measures of construct reliability and convergent validity. CR for most constructs exceeds 0.70, and AVE for most constructs exceeds 0.50, providing evidence of satisfactory construct reliability and validity. Finally, for each multi-item construct the square root of the AVE is greater than the correlations with other constructs (reported on the diagonal of Table 2 ), indicating that these constructs have good discriminating validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981) . 
Variable correlations
Pearson correlations reported in Table 2 indicate that multicollinearity poses little concern.
Consistent with greater risks prompting greater control investments, transaction characteristics that proxy for risk are positively correlated with the use of interfirm controls. The presence of prior ties is negatively correlated with control use, residual performance, and relational risk. This is consistent with firms obtaining the same (or lower) residual risk at lower cost and with fewer controls when they transact with familiar partners. Strategic resources are correlated positively with control use but negatively with residual risks. Strategic resources are not significantly correlated with proxies for transaction risk.
Importantly, this indicates that, consistent with differences between RBV and TCE theory, the motivation for exchange is conceptually different from the attributes of the transaction that make it susceptible to risk. Negative correlations between control use and residual risks are consistent with controls reducing assessed levels of residual risk. 14 The strong correlation between the two types of control, OC and BC, supports aggregation to the higher-order construct, MCS.
12 Exploratory factor analysis of all items yields the reported factor structure with no significant cross-loadings. 13 For the second-order MCS construct, CR and AVE are somewhat weaker, and the square root of the AVE is lower than the (logically high) correlations with its sub-dimensions. Because we use these control dimensions as alternative dependent variables, this poses no concerns.
The measurement of control misalignment
Like prior studies (e.g., Reuer and Ariño 2002; Sampson 2004) , we measure control misalignment as the residual from the regression that relates interfirm control and transaction characteristics that proxy for risk (left side of Figure 1 ). We conduct this analysis for MCS to obtain the primary measure of control misalignment and separately for OC and BC to explore the consistency of results between types of controls. As a validity check of control misalignment, we revisit investments in contracting as measured by the logarithm of days spent on contract development. If control misalignment reflects (in part) managers' calculated investments in control in response to transaction risks, then it should correlate positively with underinvestment in controls. We regress the time invested in contracting on the transaction characteristics, extract the residual, and multiply by negative one (-1.0). Thus greater values reflect greater underinvestment relative to transaction risks. The correlation between control misalignment and underinvestment in contractual control is positive and significant (r=0.12; p<0.05), and this holds for both OC and BC (r=0.11, and r=0.10; both p<0.10) . This confirms that the control misalignment measure captures intentional, incomplete responses to transaction risks. It also suggests that costs of control are an omitted moderator in the analysis of control decisions.
Qualifying the sample: Evidence of tradeoffs between control investments and residual risk
Before testing the research hypotheses, we conduct a preliminary test to confirm that the sample falls within the relevant range for TCE theory in which hybrid organizational forms are sustained by tradeoffs between control investments and residual risk. Results reported in Table 3 Severe multicollinearity caused by the interaction effects hinders interpretation of the results. The purpose of the Table 3 , Panel B are significantly different from zero, they are also significantly different from one. This is consistent with the observation that the measure of control misalignment used in prior empirical tests of TCE likely confounds intentional and unintentional misalignment with model misspecification.
In the absence of measurement error, the correlation between control misalignment and residual risk indicates the portion of variability of control misalignment that is associated with intentionally incomplete investments in interfirm controls. The remaining variation in control misalignment is associated with unintentional misalignment (e.g., management error in control investments or in the assessment of expected control loss) and with misspecification of the TCE model. We assume that unintentional misalignment is random and uncorrelated with the cost of control. because the correlation between residual relational risk and OC misalignment does not differ significantly between the subsamples (0.14 versus 0.13; p> 0.10).
Evidence on the moderating effects of prior ties and strategic resources
Evidence on the moderating effects of prior ties
In support of H1, we conclude that prior ties between exchange partners weaken the association between control misalignment and residual performance and relational risk. As discussed in Section 2.2, the theory linking prior ties to lower cost of control through moderating performance risk focuses on the roles of partner-specific learning and competence trust, whereas the theory for relational risk focuses on prior ties as an indication of goodwill trust. Support for H1a and H1b suggests that both learning and the 20 development of trust during prior interactions affect the cost of control and mitigate partner concerns about performance risk and relational risk that would otherwise accompany interfirm transactions.
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6.2 Evidence on the moderating effects of strategic resource importance Table 5 reports the results of testing H2. We split the sample using the median score of strategic resources to differentiate transactions with low (N=130) and high (N=157) strategic resources.
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Consistent with H2a, the results of Panels A and B show that the correlation between control misalignment and residual performance risk is smaller for transactions with low strategic resources than for transactions with high strategic resources (0.15<0.35; p<0.01), which holds for both types of controls (0.15<0.36; p<0.01, and 0.13<0.26; p<0.01). Consistent with H2b, the correlation between control misalignment and residual relational risk is significantly greater for transactions with low strategic resources than for transactions with high strategic resources (0.25>0.08; p<0.01), which also holds for both types of controls (0.21>0.02; p<0.01, and 0.26>0.12; p<0.01).
We conclude that strategic resources strengthen the association between control misalignment and residual performance risk and weaken the association between control misalignment and residual relational risk. As discussed in Section 2.3, the theory that relates strategic resources to performance risk focuses on the acceptance of greater risk in the pursuit of value creation. At the same time, the effect with respect to relational risk pivots on the role of supplier reputation that accompanies partnering with suppliers with strategic resources. Table 6 provides results of testing for joint moderating effects of prior ties and strategic resources.
The joint moderating effects of prior ties and strategic resource importance
The correlations between the three misalignment measures and residual relational and performance risk are reported for four subsamples: the conventional TCE setting (i.e., case 1: no prior ties and low strategic resources, N=62), the conventional TCE setting augmented with prior ties between partners that allow for lower control costs (i.e., case 2: prior ties and low strategic resources, N=68), resource-based motivations for collaborating (i.e., case 3: no prior ties and high strategic resources, N=61), and the setting that combines both prior interactions and resource-based motivations for collaborating (i.e., case 4: prior ties and high strategic resources, N=96). H1a and H2a predict countervailing effects, with prior ties weakening and strategic resources strengthening the association between control misalignment and 21 residual performance risk. In contrast, H1b and H2b predict consistent effects, with both prior ties and strategic resources weakening the association between misalignment and residual relational risk. We examine the stability of the results by comparing the four cases in light of the predictions. 
Conclusion
Prior studies provide compelling evidence that interfirm controls are designed in response to transaction risks. A less studied feature of control design is the degree to which the cost of control influences control investments and is thus linked to the alternative of accepting some residual risk.
Variation across firms in the cost of control may explain why firms facing common transaction risks use interfirm controls with differing intensity. To examine this explanation, we test whether two partnershipspecific characteristics that proxy for variation in the cost of control influence the control-residual risk tradeoff, as evidenced by their moderation of the association between control misalignment and residual risk.
Consistent with prior ties between exchange partners reducing the cost of control, we find that the conventional TCE measure of control misalignment correlates less strongly with residual performance and relational risk when partners have a history of prior ties than when they do not. Further, we find that control misalignment correlates more strongly with residual performance risk and less strongly with residual relational risk when transactions are motivated by buyers seeking to create value through IT investments using suppliers with unique, strategic resources. These findings are consistent with the theory that the cost of control is altered by firms' increased tolerance for performance risk in high expectedreturn activities and by enhanced partner trust based on supplier reputation that accompanies selection for strategic resources. Joint tests of these moderating effects reinforce these conclusions.
The study contributes an integrated analysis of transaction risks, partnership-specific costs of control, and the buyer's tradeoff when investing in interfirm controls and accepting residual risk. This contribution is made possible by measurement innovations, specifically direct measurement of residual risk and disaggregation of performance and relational risk. Prior studies treat the measure of misalignment derived from the TCE regression between transaction characteristics and interfirm controls as a proxy for residual risk. However, although it includes intentional and unintentional control misalignment that creates residual risk, it also includes errors introduced by any misspecification of the TCE regression model. By measuring residual risk directly, we develop an approach to examining a particular form of misspecification of the TCE regression. Specifically, we show that partnership characteristics moderate the firm's response to transaction risks in a manner consistent with predicted effects of these partnership characteristics on the cost of control. This approach requires researchers to augment their use of archival data (e.g., contracts) with survey data, and it offers a path for developing more complete models of the determinants of interfirm controls.
This paper also contributes more broadly to the literature on embedded relationships and the resource-based view of interfirm exchange. The findings support the argument that the RBV motivation for interfirm transactions is a complement rather than an alternative to TCE (Argyres and Zenger 2012; Combs and Ketchen 1999; Zajac and Olsen 1993) . Indeed, the examination of the combined effects of prior ties and strategic resources on interfirm control design provides a test of Gulati et al.'s (2009, p. 1218) proposition that prior ties and "partner distinctiveness" (conceptually related to strategic resources) work together to facilitate value creation. Separate measures of performance and relational risk allow us to disentangle two theoretically distinct effects of prior ties on the risk-control relation: efficient coordination and communication (arising with partner-specific learning and with development of competence trust) that mitigates performance risk and the formation of goodwill trust that mitigates relational risk.
Several limitations temper the interpretation and application of the results. First, although we study a wide range of IT transactions in a variety of industries, the sampling scheme (which focuses on medium-sized buyers of IT projects) limits the generalizability of the findings. Second, survey data are subject to common method bias. The use of objective indicators mitigates, but does not fully eliminate, these concerns. Better measurement could enhance construct validity and identification. Third, we collect in-depth data from buyers about transaction management but do not measure the supplier's cost of control. Suppliers also make control investments and bear residual risk; thus, relating transaction risks to only the buyer's control investments and residual risk is an incomplete picture of the control and residual risks associated with a transaction. Our approach is consistent with prior studies, but capturing data from both sides would allow analysis of both the control-residual risk tradeoff and the apportionment of control investments and risk-bearing between transacting parties. Finally, using data from two time periods, which limits the degree to which measures of residual risk are biased by known outcomes, might allow researchers to test whether higher failure rates implied by greater residual risk outweigh savings related to deliberately incomplete controls.
Figure 1: Research model and hypotheses
The left portion of the diagram depicts the measurement of misalignment of management controls as the error term in the TCE regression relating transaction risk to control investments. TCE theory predicts that the control-residual risk tradeoff is influenced by the cost of control. The research sample is first qualified as covering transactions with meaningful control-residual risk tradeoffs by testing for a positive association between control misalignment and managers' direct assessments of residual risks. The right half of the diagram depicts testing the theory using two partnership-specific factors that proxy for variation in the cost of control: prior ties between exchange partners and strategic resources. The extent to which the buyer used the following control mechanisms: -We established specific performance goals for the supplier (λ=1) -We monitored the extent to which the supplier realized the performance goals -If the supplier did not meet performance goals, they were required to explain why -We provided feedback about the extent to which the supplier achieved goals -The supplier's rewards were based on performance compared to goals The extent to which the buyer used the following control mechanisms: -We monitored the extent to which the supplier followed established procedures (λ=1) -We evaluated the procedures the supplier used to accomplish a given task -We tried to modify the supplier's procedures when desired results were not obtained -We gave the supplier feedback on the manner in which the supplier accomplished the performance goals -We participated in the supplier's cost of activities if they were carried out according to our guidelines -To evaluate the supplier's methods, the supplier had to report periodically Factor loadings are estimated using confirmatory factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation in LISREL 8.80. a All items are measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1=not at all/low degree; 5=to a very large extent/ high degree) unless noted otherwise. Scales of multiple indicator constructs are identified by fixing the loading of the indicator that was expected a priori to best represent the construct at a value of one (λ=1). For transaction value and prior ties we fix a subjectively estimated measurement error at 0.20 times the estimated total variance. b In the survey administration, items relating to outcome and behavior controls were presented in random order. c Items are standardized before the mean computation because of differences in measurement scales. 
Panel B:
Tests to qualify the sample. Correlations between control misalignment and residual performance and relational risks.
Residual Performance Risk
Residual Relational Risk MCS misalignment 0.28*** 0.17*** OC misalignment 0.28*** 0.12** BC misalignment 0.24*** 0.19*** ***, **, * indicate a p value of ≤ 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 in a two-tailed test of difference from zero. 
Panel B:
Tests of H1a and H1b, which provide the expectation that prior ties weaken the association between control misalignment and both residual performance and relational risks. 
Tests of H2a and H2b, which provide the expectation that strategic resources strengthen the association between control misalignment and residual performance risk and weaken the association between misalignment and relational risk. Case 1 versus Case 3 and Case 2 versus Case 4: H2a provides the expectation that strategic resources (SR) strengthen the association for performance risk. H2b provides the expectation that strategic resources weaken the association for relational risk. MCS misalignment 0.14 < 0.29 *** 0.20 > 0.05 *** OC misalignment 0.18 < 0.25 *** 0.15 > 0.08 *** BC misalignment 0.08 < 0.27 *** 0.24 > 0.02 *** ***, **, * indicate a p value of ≤ 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 in a one-tailed test. All significant results remain so under a two-tailed test.
